You typed the right URL. You were on the real HSBC, BBC or Ledger website. Still, the wallet address you copied could have belonged to a thief.
Short answer: The Optimizely hack was a supply chain attack on a web testing tool, not a site breach. On November 16, an attacker abused a flaw in Optimizely’s account signup flow. Next, they injected code into scripts that 178 organizations load, including HSBC, the BBC, CNN, Zoom and Ledger. The code swapped crypto wallet addresses, skimmed card numbers and targeted older iPhones. Attacker wallets received only about $7,000 in crypto, but the real damage is likely higher.
It’s the second third-party breach in crypto this week. On Monday, Trezor confirmed that its shipping partner Skladon leaked order data, as covered in our Trezor Skladon breach roundup. Here is what happened at Optimizely, who was hit and how to check your own transfers.
What Happened in the Optimizely Hack
Optimizely sells A/B testing. Big websites use it to compare two versions of a page, for example two checkout buttons. To do that, they embed a small Optimizely script. That script loads from Optimizely’s servers and runs in every visitor’s browser.
On November 16, an outsider exploited a vulnerability in Optimizely’s Experimentation product. According to Optimizely, the flaw sat in its account signup flow. Through it, the attacker added JavaScript to customer projects. In other words, nobody broke into HSBC or Ledger directly. Instead, their trusted vendor served the bad code for them.
Here is the timeline in UTC:
- 04:21, Nov 16: the first injection lands in the BBC’s snippet.
- 13:43: the attacker adds a card skimmer to the payload.
- 20:40: mass cleanup begins.
- 23:11: cleanup of the last infected snippet ends.
- 01:02, Nov 17: Optimizely publishes its notice.
Meanwhile, the attacker kept improving the code. Researchers counted 26 rebuilds of the payload in one day. Optimizely says it patched the flaw, removed the code and secured affected accounts. However, it hasn’t explained how a signup bug gave the attacker write access to other customers’ projects.
What the Malicious Code Did
Overall, the payload had four jobs.
Address swapping. First, the code scanned each page for wallet addresses on eight chains. These included Bitcoin, Ethereum, Solana, Tron, Litecoin, Toncoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin. Then it replaced them with the attacker’s addresses. It also hooked forms and the clipboard, so even an address you copied could change on the way. To stay hidden, it only touched valid addresses that sat near payment terms.
Card skimming. It grabbed card numbers, expiry dates and CVV codes typed into a site’s own payment fields. However, fields hosted by payment processors, such as Stripe’s, stayed out of reach.
Page capture. It took an image of the page and sent it to the attacker, along with the URL and cookies. Stolen cookies can sometimes let an attacker into a logged-in session.
iPhone exploits. On iPhones and iPads running iOS 18 or older, it loaded exploit kits in a hidden frame. Researchers call this conditional delivery, so nobody has confirmed a device takeover yet.
Which Sites Served the Code
Security researcher Scott Helme of Report URI found the code in 188 of the 1,611 Optimizely snippets he checked. Together, those snippets belonged to 178 organizations. Since he only checked part of Optimizely’s customer base, the true number is likely higher.
Big names include HSBC, the BBC, CNN, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, Equifax, Air France-KLM and Peacock. The code reached HSBC alone through eleven regional sites. Even Optimizely’s own homepage and login page carried the code.
By sector, banking and finance led with 32 organizations. Of the rest, six were crypto or trading firms:
- Ledger
- OANDA’s Coinpass
- IG
- Interactive Investor
- TMS Brokers
- Betashares
For obvious reasons, Ledger’s name stands out. Ledger says the code no longer runs on its website. It adds that device security was never affected and that private keys stay inside the hardware. So this hit the website layer, not the wallet firmware. We dug into Ledger’s track record before in our Ledger safety breakdown.
How Much Crypto Was Stolen
On chain, the haul looks tiny. Report URI counted about $7,040 in attacker wallets by 19:25 UTC on November 16. Later, it updated that figure to about $7,150. Here is the split:
| Chain | Received | Approx. value |
|---|---|---|
| Bitcoin | 0.0853 BTC | $5,505 |
| Litecoin | 17.02 LTC | $762 |
| Tron | 662.9 USDT and 184 TRX | $719 |
| Ethereum | 0.0745 ETH | $136 |
| Solana, Toncoin, Bitcoin Cash, Dogecoin | 0 | $0 |
That works out to roughly $40 per affected organization. Still, don’t read that as a harmless attack. After all, card numbers, cookies and any iPhone compromise leave no trace on chain. As a result, the real cost is unknown and probably much higher.
Were You Affected? How to Check
The risky window ran from roughly 04:00 to 21:00 UTC on November 16. If you used one of these sites in that window, go through these checks:
- Did you send crypto? Compare the destination with a source the web page couldn’t touch, like the recipient’s own app or a saved contact. Comparing it with what you pasted won’t help, because the code changed that text.
- Check Report URI’s wallet list. Its write-up lists the attacker’s addresses. If your transfer went to one of them, tell the platform you paid right away. Be realistic, though, as our guide on whether stolen crypto can be recovered explains.
- Did you pay by card? Review your statement this month. If anything looks off, ask your bank for a new card.
- On an iPhone or iPad? Update to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later. Report URI says those versions are patched against this kit. We covered another phone risk for wallet users in our worse_query iOS bug post.
- Reset your sessions. Because the code took cookies, log out of banking and exchange accounts you used that day, then log back in.
Why Third-Party Tools Keep Hurting Crypto Users
Security teams call this a supply chain attack. Rather than breaking into the target, the attacker compromises a vendor the target trusts. Our crypto security glossary lists famous cases, from Bybit through Safe to Ledger through CryptoBilis.
The last few weeks gave us plenty more:
- The Coinbase data breach leaked customer contacts through the analytics vendor Amplitude.
- Web3Auth, the login provider behind Keplr’s social sign-in, had a security issue that hit Google and Apple login wallets. Our Keplr Web3Auth coverage has the details.
- The Keystone data breach exposed buyer records from its Shopify store.
- This week, Trezor’s shipping partner Skladon leaked order data too.
Front ends are just as exposed. For example, the Across Protocol hack turned a trusted bridge URL into a phishing page through the domain registrar. Before that, StonkFun’s website served the Step Drainer during a 12-site domain attack.
The pattern repeats every time. You did everything right, yet the code on your screen wasn’t the code the company wrote. Notably, only 24 of 159 companies Report URI checked had browser settings strict enough to block this payload.
How to Protect Yourself From Address Swaps
You can’t audit every script on every website. You can, however, make address swaps useless.
- Verify on a second screen. A hardware wallet shows the real destination on its own display. Check it against the recipient’s app, not the web page.
- Check more than the ends. Compare the first, middle and last characters. That habit also protects you from address poisoning.
- Use saved addresses. Most exchanges let you whitelist withdrawal addresses. Those entries don’t depend on any web page.
- Send a test amount first. A small transfer costs one extra fee, but it confirms the address before the big one.
- Learn the drainer patterns. Our guide on avoiding wallet drainer scams covers the other ways websites empty wallets.
Personally, I farm with more than 100 wallets a year, so copy and paste is half my day. Attacks like this one are exactly why a quick glance at the first and last characters isn’t enough. For the full routine, see our airdrop safety page.
Keep This Content Free
Tracking 178 infected websites in one day takes time, and we keep every security post free. If this one helped, open an account on OKX or Bybit through our links. It costs you nothing extra and keeps AirdropAlert running.
Final Words
The Optimizely hack shows how little a brand name protects you. HSBC, the BBC and Ledger all served a thief’s code, without anyone breaking into their servers. The fix on your side is simple, though. Verify every address against a source the website can’t change.
We’ll update this post if Optimizely publishes a full post-mortem. Our last hack report covered the Lighter hack, where leaked API keys drained two market makers. Every breach we track also lands under our security tag.

FAQ
What is the Optimizely hack?
The Optimizely hack was a supply chain attack on November 16. An attacker exploited a flaw in Optimizely’s signup flow and injected code into scripts on 178 organizations’ websites. The code swapped crypto addresses, skimmed cards and targeted older iPhones.
Was Ledger hacked?
Not its devices. Ledger’s website loaded the infected Optimizely script, but Ledger says device security was unaffected. Private keys stay inside the hardware, and the code no longer runs on its site.
Which websites were affected by the Optimizely hack?
Report URI found 178 organizations, including HSBC, the BBC, CNN, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA and Equifax. Six were crypto or trading firms, among them Ledger, Coinpass and IG.
How much crypto was stolen in the Optimizely hack?
Attacker wallets received about $7,040 to $7,150, mostly in Bitcoin. Card data, cookies and iPhone exploits leave no on-chain trace, so the full damage is unknown.
How do I know if I was affected?
Check any crypto you sent between about 04:00 and 21:00 UTC on November 16. Compare the destination with the recipient’s own app, not the pasted text. Also review your card statement and update iOS.
Is it safe to use these websites now?
Optimizely says it removed the code and patched the flaw. Even so, verify every address on a second screen, since the next third-party attack won’t announce itself.










